For anyone who is as impatient as I am to find out what President McAleese has decided after her meeting this evening with the Council of State, the RTÉ News website is reporting:

The meeting of the Council of State called by the President ended at around 10pm. … The President has indicated she will announce her decisions tomorrow morning. …

Update (23 July 2009): Irish Independent | Irish Times here and here | Jason Walsh here and here | Slugger O’Toole.

And so we wait. Patiently?

Bonus link: meanwhile, the RTÉ news report has a link to the following story from a few weeks ago: OSCE argues against blasphemy law. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) press release to which that story refers is headed: OSCE media freedom representative welcomes Irish draft law decriminalizing libel, asks to drop ‘blasphemous libel’, and begins (with added links):

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Miklos Haraszti, welcomed today the Irish Parliament’s final preparations to decriminalize defamation, but warned that the proposal to introduce a new article on ‘blasphemous libel’ risked jeopardizing OSCE media freedom commitments. …

In today’s Irish Times, a piece by yours truly under the above headline:

Blasphemy provisions clash with Constitution

The President has very few unconstrained powers, and the Council of State is convened only rarely, but this evening they will all move centre stage, when the Council convenes to advise the President whether to refer two controversial Bills to the Supreme Court. Whatever she does about the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Bill, 2009, she should certainly refer the blasphemy provisions of the Defamation Bill, 2006 …

Read all about it here (it’s a development of my argument here).

The cases I mention in the piece are:

No, at least so far as the law is concerned. But after its initial publication in 1928, it was not until the 1960s that litigation in the US and the UK allowed it to become generally available. An op-ed by Fred Kaplan in the today’s New York Times, entitled The Day Obscenity Became Art, (with added links) tells us that

today is the 50th anniversary of the court ruling that overturned America’s obscenity laws, setting off an explosion of free speech — … The historic case began on May 15, 1959, when Barney Rosset, the publisher of Grove Press, sued the Post Office for confiscating copies of the uncensored version of D. H. Lawrence’s 1928 novel “Lady Chatterley’s Lover,” which had long been banned for its graphic sex scenes.

… Mr. Rosset hired a lawyer named Charles Rembar, … [who] presented “Lady Chatterley” as a novel of ideas that inveighed against sex without love, the mechanization of industrial life and morbid hypocrisy. … On July 21, 1959, Judge Bryan ruled in favor of Grove Press and ordered the Post Office to lift all restrictions on sending copies of “Lady Chatterley’s Lover” through the mail.

That case was Grove Press v Christenberry 175 F.Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y., 1959); it was upheld on appeal (at 276 F.2d 433 (2nd Cir., 1960) (Justitia | OpenJurist); and Robert McHenry on Britannica blog has also entertainingly marked the anniversary.

Rembar wrote about his experiences defending this book and other controversial novels in The end of obscenity; the trials of Lady Chatterley, Tropic of Cancer, and Fanny Hill (New York, Random House, 1968): Tropic of Cancer reached the Supreme Court in Grove Press v Gerstein 378 US 577 (1964), and Fanny Hill reached the same court in Memoirs v Massachusetts 383 US 413 (1966).

When these cases were decided, the leading US Supreme Court decision on obscenity was the relatively conservative Roth v US 354 US 476 (1957), and these cases were decided within its confines: the value of Grove Press v Christenberry was that it demonstrated that the Roth standard did not preclude First Amendment protection to obscene speech, at least where that speech embodied ideas of redeeming social importance. It laid the foundations for cases like Grove Press v Gerstein, Jacobellis v Ohio 378 US 184 (1964) and Memoirs v Massachusetts. These, in turn, led to the far more progressive stance taken by the Supreme Court in Miller v California 413 US 15 (1973), which held that a work is obscene and can be regulated by a State where that work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex; portrays, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and, taken as a whole, does not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The plaudits probably belong to all of these cases, and not merely to Grove Press v Christenberry, but it is still an important and entertaining case for all that.

Moreover, Lady Chatterley’s Lover had also been the basis for a contemporary challenge to the UK’s Obscene Publications Act, 1959. It is an infamous trial, from the prosecution’s notorious and patronising rhetorical demand of the jury whether it was something they would want their wives or servants to read, to the cast of literary worthies who testified to the novel’s worth, to the jury’s acquittal on 2 November 1960. The following day, Penguin sold its entire first print run of 200,000 copies, and sold 2 million copies in six weeks. The Times has a wonderful collection of archive material about the case, the full papers from the trial are now available at Bristol University Library; Penguin have recently re-issued their classic account of the trial; and the BBC have made a marvellous drama (BBC | imdb | Times) of two fictional jurors’ experience.

These were undoubtedly important developments, but I can’t help but fear that the days of such trials might come back again.

An acerbic view of academic research, via the ever-wonderful Piled Higher and Deeper:

I wrote in April about the case brought by film-maker Neville Presho, whose holiday home on Tory Island had disappeared in his absence, replaced by a car park for an adjacent hotel. At that stage, Mr Justice Murphy suggested that there may be a restitution claim for the hotel’s use of the site as a car park, and adjourned the case to receive submissions as to remedy. He gave judgment yesterday (Belfast Telegraph | Irish Independent here and here | Irish Times | RTÉ news). Murphy J held that an equitable remedy lay not in the re-instatement of the original property but in the provision of a comparable dwelling on this island or its market value, and he adjourned to October the issue of which of those options should be chosen. And so we must wait some more to learn whether the remedy really is restitutionary or whether it is founded upon more general considerations.

The saga of the Defamation Bill, 2006 is not over yet. Article 26 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (the Irish Constitution) allows the President, after consultation with Council of State, to refer a Bill to the Supreme Court for a determination of its constitutionality. President McAleese has chosen to convene the Council of State to advise her on the qustion of whether to refer not only the (controversial) Criminal Justice (Amendment) Bill, 2009 (an unsurprising move) but also the (equally controversial) blasphemy elements of the Defamation Bill, 2006 (which has come as a great surprise). (See Belfast Telegraph | BreakingNews.ie | Bock the Robber | ICCL | Irish Emigrant | Irish Independent | RTÉ news | Irish Times | PA | Slugger O’Toole. Update (18 July 2009): see also Irish Examiner | Irish Times here and here | Irish Independent | MediaWatchWatch).

There have been 15 such references to date. If the Court holds that a Bill is unconstitutional, the President must decline to sign it; whilst if the Court decides a Bill is constitutional, the President must sign it into law, and the resulting Act is immune from constitutional challenge in the future. As my colleague Oran Doyle has pointed out, this means that

… unlike in ordinary constitutional litigation, a decision made under the Article 26 reference procedure without consideration of a particular issue cannot be reopened when that issue is brought to light by another aggrieved litigant. … The tenor of the court’s reasoning in several references suggests that the court is more likely to hold legislation unconstitutional when the effect of its decision is absolute immunity for legislation considered only in the abstract.

Admittedly, the reference procedure is imperfect (see, eg, Niamh Howlin “Shortcomings and anomalies: Aspects of Article 26″ (2005) Irish Student Law Review 26 (pdf)), but if it means that the odds are in favour of striking down the blapshemy provisions of the Defamation Bill, then bring it on!

The last sentence of Article 40.6.1(i) of the Constitution provides that the publication or utterance of blasphemous material shall be an offence. In Corway v Independent Newspapers [1999] 4 IR 484 (SC), the Supreme Court declined to give any effect to the constitutional clause in the absence of a statutory provision, but that decision will be of little help in any Article 26 reference. Rather more recently, in R (on the application of Green) v The City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2007] EWHC 2785 (Admin) (05 December 2007) (discussed on this blog at the time), a Divisional Court of the English High Court held that it was the prevention of imminent public disorder probably which ensured the compatibility of the English common law offence of blasphemous libel with Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights:

[17] … The Article 10(2) basis for the crime of blasphemous libel is best found, as it seems to us, in the risk of disorder amongst, and damage to, the community generally.

The key question will be whether the influence of the Convention will mean that the Court will take a similar approach to the Constitution. Let us assume that it will. Section 36 of the Bill provides that

(2) … a person publishes or utters blasphemous matter if—
(a) he or she publishes or utters matter that is grossly abusive 10 or insulting in relation to matters held sacred by any religion, thereby causing outrage among a substantial number of the adherents of that religion, and
(b) he or she intends, by the publication or utterance of the matter concerned, to cause such outrage.

(3) It shall be a defence to proceedings for an offence under this section for the defendant to prove that a reasonable person would find genuine literary, artistic, political, scientific, or academic value in the matter to which the offence relates.

Subsection (3) is a welcome saver, but the main question will be whether subsection (2) is constitutional. There is a large gulf between the outrage envisage by the subsection and the risk of public disorder envisaged by Green. If that case is right, then this provision must be questionable under the Convention; and if a similar approach is taken under the Constitution, then this provision must also be of dubious constitutionality. I will therefore await with great interest both the President’s decision and any subsequent decision of the Supreme Court. Of course, even if she decides not to refer either Bill, a constitutional challenge is likely the first time any of the controversial provisions are invoked. Either way, therefore, the blasphemy provisions of the Defamation Bill will get their day in court.

As the slow march towards a new Supreme Court for the UK nears its destination, the Times has a piece about its newly refurbished premises:

The United Kingdom’s new Supreme Court will open its doors for business on October 1, with the first inbuilt facilities in Britain for broadcasting in court. … Broadcasting and internet arrangements are still to be devised but the three courts (two for the Supreme Court, one for the judicial committee of the Privy Council) can be filmed, a first in England and Wales.

As the BBC story on the completion of the refurbishment emphasises, the “decision to televise events from inside the court’s three chambers is a first for England and Wales”. And the Guardian quotes Jenny Rowe, the Court’s Chief Executive as saying that they are “in advanced discussions with broadcasters about the material they will want to use … If broadcasters wish to show it we will make it available”.

I think that it is a splendid idea. As the Canadian blawgs Slaw and the Court point out, since February 2009, the Supreme Court of Canada has provided live streaming of oral arguments and judges’ questions in authorized cases. The whole experiment is working well, and doing the same in the UK is an excellent development. When will the Irish Supreme Court follow suit? Will it ever catch on here? It can only help to promote public confidence in the administration of justice at the highest level. After all, not only would justice be done, it would be seen to be done.

The European Legal Network, a professional network of legal experts facilitated by the Freedom Task Force which promotes free software licensing as part of the work of the Free Software Foundation Europe, has just announced the launch of the International Free and Open Source Software Law Review. It is a peer reviewed biannual journal for high-level analysis and debate about Free and Open Source Software legal issues, and it will receive financial and administrative support from the NLNet Foundation, which supports organizations and people that contribute to an open information society. Edited by Andrew Katz and Amanda Brock, its focus includes copyright, licence implementation, licence interpretation, software patents, open standards, case law and statutory changes. Unsurprisingly, it operates a strong Open Access Policy, providing immediate open access to its content on the principle that making research freely available to the public supports a greater global exchange of knowledge.

Given recent developments relating to Creative Commons licences for Ireland, I was particularly taken by two pieces in the first issue discussing Jacobsen v Katzer and Kamind Associates 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed.Cir.2008) (pdf), in which the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit granted a preliminary injunction to enforce the terms of the OSI’s open source Artistic Licence (see JOLT | Lessig | OSI | Stanford CIS; Brian F Fitzgerald and Rami Olwan “The legality of free and open source software licences: the case of Jacobsen v. Katzer” in Mark Perry and Brian F Fitzgerald (eds) Knowledge Policy for the 21st Century (Irwin Law, Canada, forthcoming) (abstract).

Long may the International Free and Open Source Software Law Review prosper!