First, to my posts on grading and marking, I must add a wonderful post by not that kind of doctor applying the Elisabeth Kübler-Ross model of five stages of grief – denial, anger, bargaining, depression, acceptance – to the process of grading papers! Wonderful (h/t efdel).

Second, in another grading and marking story, this time by way of comparison with my posts on Andrew Croskery’s case against QUB, consider the case of a student who sued the University of Pennsylvania for awarding him a degree from their engineering college rather than Wharton School of Business: his misrepresentation and unjust enrichment claims failed.

Third, in one of my posts on the Croskery litigation, I analysed a similar recent case in the Ontario Court of Appeal: Jaffer v York University 2010 ONCA 654 (7 October 2010). There’s an interesting post on the case on the Canadian blog, The Court, This Student Isn’t Just a Number:

(1) Universities: Now, Not-So-Independent Centres of Learning
Perhaps the most interesting and relevant aspect of this case concerns the Court’s finding that academic disputes grounded in contract or tort can be heard by the Superior Court of Justice in Ontario. Karakatsanis JA overturned the motion judge’s finding that academic disputes on the basis of a very recent decision not available to the motion judge, Gauthier v Saint-Germain 2010 ONCA 309.

Gauthier establishes that in cases where the elements of a breach of contract or negligence are properly pleaded, the Superior Court will have jurisdiction to hear a claim even when a dispute is academic in nature and arises from the academic activities of the university. While the University argued Gauthier was wrongly decided, Karakatsanis JA clearly addressed and disposed of this line of reasoning, finding that past decisions upholding the dismissal of claims relating to academic matters were done under r. 21.01(1) as the pleadings did not disclose a reasonable cause of action based upon tort, contract or negligence, not on the basis the court lacked jurisdiction.

Karakatsanis JA emphasized though, that the court’s jurisdiction will only extend to academic disputes with causes of action in tort or contract. For internal academic decisions not grounded in a civil cause of action, judicial review remains the appropriate remedy. However, the court will (and does) have jurisdiction to hear claims with a basis in tort or contract – the scholastic nature of the dispute is irrelevant.

In my opinion, I agree that this is the correct outcome. Establishing this guideline will only allow those claims with more substance than a single student’s biased belief or personal grudge to be heard. We must remember that students agree to be subject to their institution’s discretion in resolving academic matters upon enrolling, and only substantiated academic issues should be brought before the Superior Court.

Finally, for those who have reached this far, a cartoon from PhD Comics about the realities of weekend marking (click on the image for a bigger version):

Via the incomparable 9th level Ireland blog, I (rather belatedly) learn that Andrew Croskery, a graduate of Queen’s University Belfast who has taken judicial review proceedings to challenge his degree results (on which I have previously blogged: 1, 2, 3, 4; and there is also an excellent post Jason Smith), might have got a result during the week. According to the BBC, QUB has agreed to review his grade. It seems that he was only 0.5% off obtaining a 2:1 in his degree, and in his judicial review proceedings, he claimed that if he had received better supervision he would have achieved that 2:1. On Tuesday, the High Court granted a three-week adjournment to allow QUB to review his degree classification on the alleged grounds of inadequate supervision and procedural irregularities. QUB told the Court that it made the proposal without prejudice in a bid to ease his concerns. Moreover, the Belfast Telegraph reported that if he is still unhappy with the outcome, he would now be able to appeal his results. As Education Law Blog points out

This appears to be a successful outcome for the student, as the provision of a review is about as much as he could have expected to achieve by way of his legal proceedings. Whether his degree result will actually be improved remains to be seen.

This change of tack on the part of QUB is surprising. According to the the Belfast Telegraph [with added links]:

Queen’s graduate’s courtroom challenge to awarding of 2:2 degree ‘opens a can of worms’

A landmark legal case being taken by a graduate seeking to overturn his degree classification could open up a “can of worms” for all academical institutions, it has been warned. … the University and College Union, which represents more than 120,000 academics and staff across the UK, has said this case could end up setting a “dangerous legal precedent” which could potentially threaten academic freedom.

Professor Bob Osborne, from the University of Ulster’s School of Criminology, Politics and Social Policy, said he was surprised that Queen’s had changed its stance.

I am very surprised that any university is prepared to re-open the classification of a degree after someone has graduated — unless due process has not taken place … If it is confirmed, it does open a huge can of worms. However it may be a defensive position that the university thinks it is better to get rid of the problem rather than having to go before the court. It is unusual unless a student has convinced the university that there has been some malpractice which has led to them being disadvantaged. Maybe they have now uncovered some new evidence.

Jonathan Bell, chairman of the Committee for Employment and Learning, said:

The consequences of any decision in this case are going to be major and I have no doubt that is in the minds of the people as they conduct themselves. There will be a lot of interest to see the outcome. What we at the Employment and Learning Committee will be asking is ‘what can we learn from this? The system has changed a lot culturally since I was at Queen’s in the late 80s when there were no fees and you got a grant. There has been a psychological shift where people are paying for a service therefore they want a good service. And, if there is something legitimate that they think is wrong with the service, they have a right to ask for a review. However I think that courts, in all situations, should be used as a last resort.

Omar Ha-Redeye has blogged on Slaw about an Ontario CA decision that is very relevant to the judicial review proceedings being taken by Andrew Croskery to challenge his degree results in Queen’s University Belfast (on which I have previously blogged: 1, 2, 3). The gravamen of those posts was that courts are slow to disturb substantive academic decisions, though beyond that sphere, they will of course give effect to claims in tort or for breach of contract. This distinction is at the heart of the case at issue in Omar’s blogpost: Jaffer v York University 2010 ONCA 654 (7 October 2010).

In this case, the plaintiff challenged a decision to exclude him at the end of his first year because he had not maintained a sufficient grade average, on the grounds that the university had failed to make proper accommodation for his Trisomy 21 (Down’s Syndrome) and that he had detrimentally relied on an alleged promise by a professor to defer his status while the dispute over disability was resolved. His claim failed at first instance, in part on the ground that, “[w]hile there may be contractual or tortious issues within the broader claim, if the pith and substance of the impugned conduct is academic in nature, the action cannot be continued in the courts” ([24] Pitt J). This does not seem surprising, since the proposition that the Courts will be slow to interfere in matters of purely academic judgment is well-established as a matter of Canadian law (see, eg, Harelkin v University of Regina 1979 CanLII 18 (SCC), [1979] 2 SCR 561 (30 March 1979); followed in Ontario in Paine v University of Toronto (1982) 34 OR (2d) 770 (Ont CA) and Gauthier v Saint-Germain 2010 ONCA 309 (CanLII) (3 May 2010) ([30]-[31], [46], [50] Rouleau jca, en français)).

On the other hand, in Gauthier, Rouleau jca pointed out that since the relationship between a student and university is, of its nature, contractual, it can give rise to obligations both in contract and in tort ([32]-[33], [46]) and the court does not lack jurisdiction solely because the claim arises out of a dispute of an academic nature ([45]). This, too, is well established in Canadian law (Young v Bella 2006 SCC 3 (CanLII), [2006] 1 SCR 108 (27 January 2006)). As ever, the question is not so much about the line as to the side of it on which any given case might fall.

In the appeal in Jaffer, Karakatsanis JA held that Rouleau jca’s judgment in Gauthier “clarified that the decisions of this court upholding the dismissal of claims relating to academic matters did not do so on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction …, but rather … because the pleadings did not disclose a reasonable cause of action based upon contract, tort, or negligence or … because the cause of action was untenable in law” ([22]). In other words, the proper judicial deference to academic decisions does not deprive the court of jurisdiction, but it does mean that the plaintiff has no exigible claim.

Hence, the question in Jaffer was not whether the dispute was academic in nature, but rather whether the pleadings support a cause of action in either contract or tort ([31]). Unlike Pitt J at first instance, Karakatsanis JA for the Court of Appeal held that appellant’s various claims did not implicate purely academic judgments, so she considered the breach of contract and negligent misrepresenation issues, and found them both wanting. In other words, the distinction between Pitt J and the Court of Appeal turned on the characterisation of the issues as purely academic or not. Unlike Pitt J, Karakatsanis JA held that the issues were not purely academic, and thus went on to consider whether there was a breach of contract or a tort. She found that there was no basis in the facts pleaded upon which to find that accommodation was an express or implied term of the contract between the university and Jaffer, and thus dismissed the breach of contract claim. She also found that the professor’s offer did not constitute a misrepresentation and that there was no causal link between the allged misrepresentation and the damages claimed, so she also dismissed the misrepresentation claim. However, she did allow the appeal to the extent of permitting Jaffer to amend the Statement of Claim to plead the breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation issues with greater particularity.

On this approach, the question which would arise in Andrew Croskery’s application is whether the matter is one of purely academic judgment. If it is, then the Court will not lack jurisdiction but it will be particularly slow to hold against the university. If it is not, then the court can go on to consider his substantive claims. I await Mr Justice Treacy’s decision with interest.

Further to my two previous posts concerning student challenges to degree classification, there is a piece in this week’s Times Higher Education on the judicial review proceedings taken by Andrew Croskery challenging his degree results in Queen’s University Belfast. The piece contains some interesting reactions to the challenge [with added links]:

Grievance poses academy ‘threat’

… Bahram Bekhradnia, director of the Higher Education Policy Institute, warned that if the case were successful it could unleash a wave of similar challenges. “Of course it is important that universities do right by students. But if a student feels they are getting inadequate supervision, contact or anything else, they should deal with it up front and at the time. Otherwise the floodgates will be opened and it will be impossible to judge genuine cases from chancers,” he said.

Roger Brown, professor of higher education policy at Liverpool Hope University, described the case as a battle between academic authority and the marketisation of higher education. He said a ruling in favour of Mr Croskery would be “disastrous” because it would undermine universities’ academic authority. He noted that legal challenges of college grades were quite common in the US but said British courts had taken the view in similar previous cases that universities were in the best position to make academic judgements.

Richard Langley, head of litigation and dispute resolution at law firm Bircham Dyson Bell, said Mr Croskery would have an “uphill struggle” to prove that the university had acted irrationally in not increasing his grade. “It involves a very subjective judgement and it is impossible to determine what he would have got with different supervision,” he said. He also warned that, at best, the judge would require the university to reconsider its decision, which it may uphold. …

No sooner had I published yesterday’s post on student challenges to degree classification, and examiners’ academic freedom, than Afua Hirsh blogged that it’s not just law students who are learning how to sue. Against the background of the QUB case which I discussed in that post, she gave many other examples of cases in which students sued their universities because they had performed poorly in their degrees. (Indeed, yet another may be brewing here). In many of the cases Afua discusses, the students were successful in their claims. But probably the most important case she discusses concerned a Belgian DPhil student who claimed £3m from Oxford University for failing his thesis. George Van Mellaert complained about the examiners and about the university’s procedures. Unlike many of the other cases to which Afua referred, this case did not have a happy outcome for the student. As she said:

The court was less impressed with this claim, stating that “the claimant’s thesis is a matter of academic judgment with which it would be inappropriate for the court to interfere”.

Almost as soon as I had finished reading her article, I received an email from Martin George, with the full text of the decision in George van Mellaert v Oxford University [2006] EWHC 1565 (QB) (29 June 2006). I’m very grateful to him for having done so, and I in turn make it available here (pdf) Read the rest of this entry »

Some time ago, I blogged about the question of whether a low mark is a breach of contract. A little while ago, in a gallimaufry (omnibus) post, I briefly returned to this issue. The context was a US case, Keefe v New York Law School (17 November 2009), but now it seems that the issue has arisen rather closer to home. Yesterday’s Irish Times tells the story:

Graduate takes university to court over degree results

A Queen’s University [Belfast] graduate yesterday launched a High Court challenge to his degree classification. In one of the first cases of its kind, Andrew Croskery has brought judicial review proceedings over his lower second-class honours classification.

Mr Croskery, from Co Down, claims if he had received better supervision he would have instead obtained an upper second-class in his electrical engineering degree.

Read more here.

There is similar coverage on the BBC and UTV; in the Belfast Telegraph, Cherwell, the Guardian (also here, on the Human Rights in Ireland blog), and the Mirror; and commentary on the Cantakerous, Gullibility, and Learning Architecture blogs. Update: Slugger O’Toole’s post has the QUB regulations at issue.

The New York and Belfast cases raise two important issues. First, at private law, when can there be a contract between a student and a university, and as a matter of policy will the courts get involved in purely academic matters to determine whether the contract has been breached? Gullibility argues strongly that the metaphor of students as customers is misleading, and that Andrew Croskery’s case should be dismissed.

Second, universities in the UK – and, for that matter, Ireland – have more of a public flavour than US colleges normally have, the question arises as to whether they are subject to judicial review, and if so, whether the courts will as a matter of policy accord significant deference to purely academic matters.

Whether at public law or at private law, a judicial policy of declining to get involved in purely academic decisions respects the academic freedom of the university and the examiners to make academic decisions. Provided that the appropriate procedures have been followed, the courts are very slow to go behind substantive academic decisions. The classic US cases are Board of Curators, University of Missouri v Horowitz 435 US 78 (1978) and University of Michigan v Ewing 474 US 214 (1985); (and see eg Douglas Rush “Through the Looking Glass: Judicial Deference to Academic Decision Makers …” bepress esp Part III). An extremely strong version of this judicial deference can be discerned in the Irish High Court in Quinn v Honourable Society of King’s Inns [2004] IEHC 220 (15 June 2004) in which Smyth J declined to give the applicant leave to challenge an exam grade. The reports do not make clear whether counsel for QUB referred to this case, though he did argue that the judicial review application should be dismissed as the court was not the proper forum for the challenge. Mr Justice Treacy adjourned the application and will give his decision on the application for leave to commence judicial review proceedings next month.

I await judgment with great interest, and some trepidation. Doubtless I will blog about it when it is handed down. Now, in the meantime, perhaps I had better reconsider my marking techniques!