Using the Press Ombudsman and Press Council mechanisms will allow media complaints to be settled without lawyers, as expensive legal processes will be invoked much less frequently following the enactment of the Defamation Act, 2009 according to the Press Ombudsman, Prof John Horgan. On the one hand, he would say that wouldn’t he? On the other, I hope that he’s right; it’s much too early to tell, of course, but that is the intention behind the establishment and recognition of his office.

However, not only is bringing a complaint to his office cheaper and quicker, it’s probably also safer than going to court. According to the Irish Times breaking news service, a judge was accidentally shot in court; but the facts were rather more prosaic, and the later print version of the article explained that pellets from a toy gun struck the judge at a family law hearing.

I’ve written about this report twice already. The first occasion was when a committee chaired by Ms Justice Susan Denham of the Supreme Court was established to consider the necessity for a new Irish Court of Appeal (this was in part a response to an article on the point which Judge Denham had written the previous year in the [2006] 1 Judicial Institute Studies Journal 1 (pdf)). The second occasion when the Government received the committee’s report. In the most recent installment of this slow-moving story, the report was published last week – only three months after it was submitted to government – and to generally favourable reviews in the media (see Belfast Telegraph | Irish Independent here and here | Irish Times | RTÉ). Read the rest of this entry »

The saga of the Defamation Bill, 2006 is not over yet. Article 26 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (the Irish Constitution) allows the President, after consultation with Council of State, to refer a Bill to the Supreme Court for a determination of its constitutionality. President McAleese has chosen to convene the Council of State to advise her on the qustion of whether to refer not only the (controversial) Criminal Justice (Amendment) Bill, 2009 (an unsurprising move) but also the (equally controversial) blasphemy elements of the Defamation Bill, 2006 (which has come as a great surprise). (See Belfast Telegraph | BreakingNews.ie | Bock the Robber | ICCL | Irish Emigrant | Irish Independent | RTÉ news | Irish Times | PA | Slugger O’Toole. Update (18 July 2009): see also Irish Examiner | Irish Times here and here | Irish Independent | MediaWatchWatch).

There have been 15 such references to date. If the Court holds that a Bill is unconstitutional, the President must decline to sign it; whilst if the Court decides a Bill is constitutional, the President must sign it into law, and the resulting Act is immune from constitutional challenge in the future. As my colleague Oran Doyle has pointed out, this means that

… unlike in ordinary constitutional litigation, a decision made under the Article 26 reference procedure without consideration of a particular issue cannot be reopened when that issue is brought to light by another aggrieved litigant. … The tenor of the court’s reasoning in several references suggests that the court is more likely to hold legislation unconstitutional when the effect of its decision is absolute immunity for legislation considered only in the abstract.

Admittedly, the reference procedure is imperfect (see, eg, Niamh Howlin “Shortcomings and anomalies: Aspects of Article 26″ (2005) Irish Student Law Review 26 (pdf)), but if it means that the odds are in favour of striking down the blapshemy provisions of the Defamation Bill, then bring it on!

The last sentence of Article 40.6.1(i) of the Constitution provides that the publication or utterance of blasphemous material shall be an offence. In Corway v Independent Newspapers [1999] 4 IR 484 (SC), the Supreme Court declined to give any effect to the constitutional clause in the absence of a statutory provision, but that decision will be of little help in any Article 26 reference. Rather more recently, in R (on the application of Green) v The City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2007] EWHC 2785 (Admin) (05 December 2007) (discussed on this blog at the time), a Divisional Court of the English High Court held that it was the prevention of imminent public disorder probably which ensured the compatibility of the English common law offence of blasphemous libel with Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights:

[17] … The Article 10(2) basis for the crime of blasphemous libel is best found, as it seems to us, in the risk of disorder amongst, and damage to, the community generally.

The key question will be whether the influence of the Convention will mean that the Court will take a similar approach to the Constitution. Let us assume that it will. Section 36 of the Bill provides that

(2) … a person publishes or utters blasphemous matter if—
(a) he or she publishes or utters matter that is grossly abusive 10 or insulting in relation to matters held sacred by any religion, thereby causing outrage among a substantial number of the adherents of that religion, and
(b) he or she intends, by the publication or utterance of the matter concerned, to cause such outrage.

(3) It shall be a defence to proceedings for an offence under this section for the defendant to prove that a reasonable person would find genuine literary, artistic, political, scientific, or academic value in the matter to which the offence relates.

Subsection (3) is a welcome saver, but the main question will be whether subsection (2) is constitutional. There is a large gulf between the outrage envisage by the subsection and the risk of public disorder envisaged by Green. If that case is right, then this provision must be questionable under the Convention; and if a similar approach is taken under the Constitution, then this provision must also be of dubious constitutionality. I will therefore await with great interest both the President’s decision and any subsequent decision of the Supreme Court. Of course, even if she decides not to refer either Bill, a constitutional challenge is likely the first time any of the controversial provisions are invoked. Either way, therefore, the blasphemy provisions of the Defamation Bill will get their day in court.

As the slow march towards a new Supreme Court for the UK nears its destination, the Times has a piece about its newly refurbished premises:

The United Kingdom’s new Supreme Court will open its doors for business on October 1, with the first inbuilt facilities in Britain for broadcasting in court. … Broadcasting and internet arrangements are still to be devised but the three courts (two for the Supreme Court, one for the judicial committee of the Privy Council) can be filmed, a first in England and Wales.

As the BBC story on the completion of the refurbishment emphasises, the “decision to televise events from inside the court’s three chambers is a first for England and Wales”. And the Guardian quotes Jenny Rowe, the Court’s Chief Executive as saying that they are “in advanced discussions with broadcasters about the material they will want to use … If broadcasters wish to show it we will make it available”.

I think that it is a splendid idea. As the Canadian blawgs Slaw and the Court point out, since February 2009, the Supreme Court of Canada has provided live streaming of oral arguments and judges’ questions in authorized cases. The whole experiment is working well, and doing the same in the UK is an excellent development. When will the Irish Supreme Court follow suit? Will it ever catch on here? It can only help to promote public confidence in the administration of justice at the highest level. After all, not only would justice be done, it would be seen to be done.

Albie Sachs is a remarkable man. His official bio begins

On turning six, during World War II, Albie Sachs received a card from his father expressing the wish that he would grow up to be a soldier in the fight for liberation.

He began that fight as a seventeen year old law student; as a lawyer, the bulk of his work involved defending people charged under apartheid’s racist and repressive security laws – many of them faced the death penalty. As a result he was harassed by the security police, detained in solitary confinement for two prolonged spells of detention, tortured by sleep deprivation, forced into exile in 1966, and in 1988 blown up by a car bomb which cost him his right arm and the sight of an eye. In exile, he worked as an academic in the UK and Mozambique, campaigned for human rights and an end to apartheid, and thought deeply and wrote widely about the role of law as a protector of human dignity in the modern world. He wrote many of the ANC’s constitutional documents, helped to negotiate South Africa’s transition to constitutional democracy and to draft its post-apartheid Constitution, and was one of the founding judges of the Constitutional Court in 1994. The Court’s first hearing, in S v Makwanyane (CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3 (6 June 1995) (also here), concerned the constitutionality of the death penalty, which it unanimously found to be unconstitutional. As his term on the Court nears its conclusion, he has written a beautiful memoir The Strange Alchemy of Life and Law (OUP, 2009); from the publisher’s website:

The book provides unique access to an insider’s perspective on modern South Africa, and a rare glimpse into the working of a judicial mind. By juxtaposing life experiences and extracts from judgments, Sachs enables the reader to see the complex and surprising ways in which legal culture transforms subjective experience into objectively reasoned decisions. With rare candour he tells of the difficulties he has when preparing a judgment, of how every judgment is a lie. Rejecting purely formal notions of the judicial role he shows how both reason and passion (concern for protecting human dignity) are required for law to work in the service of justice.

Two of his judgments will help to give the measure of the man as a judge. First, in Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie (CCT 60/04) [2005] ZACC 19 (1 December 2005) (also here) he held that the definition of marriage as between a man and a woman was inconsistent with the Constitution since it excluded same-sex couples, and the failure to provide them the means to enjoy the same status, entitlements and responsibilities accorded to heterosexual couples through marriage constituted an unjustifiable violation of their rights. And in S v M (CCT 53/06) [2007] ZACC 18 (26 September 2007) (also here) he reversed a prison sentence on a woman primarily because it would infringe the human rights of her three children. He tells the story of the former case in this extraordinary University of Chicago talk; he tells the story of the latter case in this fascinating Guardian interview; and there are wonderful pieces (part interview, part review of Alchemy, part meditation) about him in The Scotsman, The Independent (SA), and The Independent (UK). The Guardian interview says that, at the time he was writing the judgment in S v M (with added links):

Sachs did not know of any country that took the rights of offenders’ children into account, but he subsequently discovered that similar ideas were being framed in Scotland in a report by the then children’s commissioner, Kathleen Marshall.

The report, Not Seen, Not Heard, Not Guilty, argues that the rights of offenders’ children to family life under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child are systematically ignored by the court system. The report found that almost two-thirds of prisoners in the Cornton Vale women’s prison in Stirling had children under 18, but there was no provision to take their rights into account during sentencing.

“This was astonishing,” Sachs told the audience. “In a totally different legal system, in a totally different society, a conclusion was being reached that is almost identical. It showed that the time has come for new ways of thinking.”

That is as true of Ireland as it is of Scotland as it is of South Africa. The Irish Council for Civil Liberties (ICCL) has recently published an important paper on Protecting Children and Respecting the Rule of Law (pdf) written by Roisin Webb. It demonstrates one of the ways in which we can all benefit from the wisdom, justice and humanity of Albie Sachs.

I have already written on this blog about reforms to judicial dress in England and Wales (the image on the right is a well-known example of the previous judicial court dress). Now comes news that Ireland may follow suit. From today’s Irish Independent (with added links):

Fashion guru revamps judges’ robes

Fashion guru Louise Kennedy has been commissioned by the Chief Justice to create an unprecedented new range of designer robes for the country’s judges. Samples of the robes were unveiled last week by John Murray, the Chief Justice, during a judicial training day in Adare, Co Limerick. … it is feared that the cost of the inaugural judicial makeover could lead to the project, the brainchild of Judge Murray, being put on hold until the public finances improve. …

The last effort to change judicial attire occurred in the mid- 1920s when Hugh Kennedy — the first Chief Justice of the Irish Free State — sought to break from away from the English tradition by introducing an exclusive Irish range of robes. According to Judge Kennedy’s papers, there is correspondence on the planned design of judicial robes between Kennedy, William Butler Yeats and printmaker Charles Shannon. But the project did not attract political approval. …

I’m sure that the time has come for Irish judges to simplify their judicial dress, but I’m not sure I would go as far as the reforms across the Irish sea. I would phase out wigs, wing collars and bands, and the black coat and vest, leaving a streamlined requirement simply of a black Irish poplin gown over an appropriate dark suit. Moreover, I would have no objection to the idea of revising the design of the gown, though I will have to withhold judgment until (either) Kennedy’s designs are published. Moreover, if it happens on the bench, will the bar follow suit?

Some time ago, in a similarly titled post, I discussed the establishment of a committee chaired by Ms Justice Susan Denham of the Supreme Court which was to consider the necessity for a possible new Court of Appeal. I thought it a good idea then, and still do now. According to Carol Coulter in today’s Irish Times, the Government has just received the committee’s report:

Logjam in Supreme Court appeals not serving justice

ANALYSIS: Too few judges hearing appeals and a recent proliferation of lay litigants means judgment delays of years, writes Carol Coulter

… the need for a Court of Civil Appeal to hear most appeals from the High Court, leaving the Supreme Court to deal with constitutional cases and those involving fundamental points of law, … arises from the increasing volume of cases going to the Supreme Court, resulting in lengthy delays. There can be up to three years’ delay in a case appealed from the High Court getting a hearing in the Supreme Court. Read the rest of this entry »

Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) (left) was a utilitarian philosopher, whose radical ideas on education inspired those who founded University College London. Nowadays, the Bentham Association (formerly the Bentham Club) is the Alumni Association for UCL’s lawyers, and it annually hosts a Presidential Address from an invited senior lawyer. This year’s address was given by Lord Pannick QC on the topic:

“Better that a horse should have a voice in that House [of Lords], than that a judge should” (Jeremy Bentham).

Replacing the Law Lords by a Supreme Court

It broadly concerned the implications of the removal of the final court of appeal from parliament, and can be heard online here. It covers a wide range of very interesting material, and is very well worth listening to. There’s no text yet online, but one aspect of it appears in Pannick’s column in today’s Times, taking the field on an issue I’ve looked at already on this blog (here and here); some extracts:

Seventy is far too early for a supreme court judge to retire . . .

… The argument for a retirement age of 75 for all supreme court justices is very simple. Those appointed are the cream of the judiciary. They inevitably take time to rise to the top, normally after serving for several years in the High Court and then in the Court of Appeal. It seems an awful shame to throw out judicial resources of such quality after a short stay in the supreme court when they are still fresh in mind and body and well short of their sell-by date.

… One can sympathise with the comments of Lord Bridge of Harwich in his final case in the Appellate Committee in 1995 when he expressed his annoyance at “the statutory presumption of judicial incompetence at the age of 75”. Lord Bridge, still at the peak of his considerable intellectual powers, went off to study for a mathematics degree.

… The appropriate balance between innovation and experience (or, if you prefer, between immaturity and senility) is, I think, a retirement age of 70 for judges of the High Court and the Court of Appeal. But for the supreme court, given the length of time that it will take for judges to arrive at such legal heights, a retirement age of 75 is more appropriate. Lords Reid, Wilberforce and Bingham of Cornhill, whose intellectual force, constitutional perspective, and good sense adorned the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords over the past 40 years, did much of their best work after 70. It would be a great detriment to the legal system if their successors were prematurely retired to a life as arbitrators.

On this one, I’m with Pannick, but I’m not sure Bentham would have approved: he didn’t trust judges much.


Update: joining Pannick’s column in the Times Online is the following related news story:

Judges fail in Tribunal bid to extend working lives beyond 70

Two judges fighting to work beyond the age of 70 have lost their case, the Tribunals Service has said. … The decision coincides with a move by legal peers to enable Britain’s top judges – those appointed to the new Supreme Court in the autumn – to stay on until the age of 75. …

I’ve blogged about the judges’ age discrimination challenge already; what I find most interesting is the throwaway line in the article that legal peers are lining up to support a retirement age of 75.