Irish cases – cearta.ie

It’s not everyday that the prospect of an action in the Irish High Court makes worldwide headlines. But a case about the mechanism by which a member state can depart from the European Union is doing just that.

The background lies in last June’s referendum in the United Kingdom, in which the majority voted leave the EU. As a matter of European law, the departure process is provided in Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. The UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, has stated repeatedly that she wants to begin this process before the end of March next year, and the House of Commons on Wednesday voted to approve this timetable.

The Article 50 process is a recent enough creation. It was inserted into the Treaty by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, and it came into force in 2009. It provides that a departing state must notify the European Council of its intention to leave; and it gives the EU and the departing state two years to negotiate the departure arrangements. But the departure of a state from the EU hasn’t happened before; so we are in uncharted waters, both politically and legally; and ambiguities in the text of Article 50 don’t help.…

Article 50 in the Irish High Court: cometh the hour, cometh the case?

29 November, 20163 January, 2017

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| ECJ, Irish cases

It is a rare provision of a Treaty, or a constitution, or an Act, that achieves fame or notoriety simply by means of its number. The First Amendment is so famous the world over that we do not need to be told that it is a clause in the Bill of Rights to the US Constitution. Section 31 was once just as notorious in Ireland. Rapidly joining this pantheon is Article 50. It is an Article of the Treaty on European Union, inserted by the Treaty of Lisbon, to provide a mechanism by which a Member State may withdraw from the EU. It has been plucked from the obscurity of an EU Treaty and thrust into the glare of worldwide headlines by the UK referendum on 23 June 2016 in which the majority of participants voted to leave the EU.

The interpretation of Article 50 has provoked much political and legal discussion, but little consensus. Indeed, I have commented twice on this blog (here and here) on the question whether a notice served by the UK under that Article may be suspended or withdrawn. Only the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) can answer that question authoritatively.…

Some reflections on @RuadhanIT’s excellent @IrishTimes series on the Irish Supreme Court

11 July, 201318 May, 2016

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| Irish cases, Irish Law, Irish Society, Irish Supreme Court, Judicial Appointments

In Brown v Allen 344 US 443, 540 (1953), Robert H Jackson, Chief Prosecutor at Nuremburg and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States said of that Court:

We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.

Supreme Courts’ quality of finality, on matters of the gravest import, fascinates observers; and, giving us a chance to go behind that finality closer to home, Ruadhán Mac Cormaic (@RuadhanIT) has an excellent series of articles on the Irish Supreme Court in the Irish Times. Here (with some added links and a few comments) is a flavour of his coverage over the last few days.

Inside Ireland’s Supreme Court: “… Nearly all judges resist labels such as liberal or conservative, pro-State or pro-plaintiff and dismiss attempts to extrapolate from their background a predisposition to decide a case a certain way. …”. Nevertheless, it is a persistent trope amongst watchers of the US Supreme Court (and of the UK courts, though perhaps less so), and it is likely to become so for the Irish Supreme Court as well, if the planned Court of Appeal allows the Supreme Court to become more of a constitutional court in the mo(u)ld of its US counterpart.…

Unconstitutional expenditures – VII – The judgments in McCrystal, Part 2

14 December, 20124 February, 2013

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| Irish cases, Irish Law, Irish Supreme Court

In McCrystal v The Minister for Children and Youth Affairs [2012] IESC 53 (8 November 2012), the Supreme Court’s per curiam established that the respondents had expended public moneys on a booklet, website, and advertising campaign in relation to a referendum in a manner which was not fair, equal, impartial or neutral. In judgments handed down on 11 December 2012 by Denham CJ, Murray J, Fennelly J, and O’Donnell J (Hardiman J concurring with all four) the Court gave reasons for the conclusions which had been expressed in the per curiam. My analysis of these judgments is in two parts. The first part, in my previous post, considered some of the issues raised in the judgments. The second part, in this post, considers the impact which those judgments have on the issues raised in my earlier posts (I, II, III, IV, V, VI).

From my previous post, it is clear that, in McCrystal, the Supreme Court made two main findings. First, where the Government acts in clear disregard of the Constitution, then the Courts can intervene. Second, arising from McKenna v An Taoiseach (No 2) [1995] 2 IR 10, [1995] IESC 11 (17 November 1995), there is an obligation upon the Government, if it wishes to expend money providing information in relation to a referendum, to do so in a manner that is fair, equal, impartial and neutral.…

Unconstitutional expenditures – VI – The judgments in McCrystal, Part 1

13 December, 20124 February, 2013

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| Irish cases, Irish Law, Irish Supreme Court

CHILDRENSREFERENDUM-300x217 Regular readers of this blog will be familiar with my series of five posts so far (I, II, III, IV, V) on the per curiam in McCrystal v The Minister for Children and Youth Affairs [2012] IESC 53 (8 November 2012) (also here), which held that the defendants’ expenditure of public moneys on a website, booklet and advertisements in relation to the children’s referendum was in breach of the prohibition in McKenna v An Taoiseach (No 2) [1995] 2 IR 10, [1995] IESC 11 (17 November 1995). In the per curiam on 8 November last, the Court announced its decision, and said that judgments would be delivered on 11 December 2012. And, indeed, they duly were – judgments were delivered by Denham CJ, Murray J, Fennelly J, and O’Donnell J; Hardiman J concurred with all four. These judgments have already been the subject of a post by Paul McMahon on Ex Tempore blog, as well as a great deal of media comment (98fm | Belfast Telegraph | Irish Examiner | Irish Independent here, here, here and here | Irish Times here, here, here, here and here | RTÉ | TV3).…

Unconstitutional expenditures – V – An update on remedies for breach of the McKenna prohibition

20 November, 20124 February, 2013

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| Irish cases, Irish Law, Irish Supreme Court

In four previous posts, I looked at the Supreme Court’s per curiam in McCrystal v The Minister for Children and Youth Affairs [2012] IESC 53 (8 November 2012) (also here), which held that the defendants had acted wrongfully in expending public moneys on a website, booklet and advertisements in relation to the children’s referendum, in breach of the prohibition in McKenna v An Taoiseach (No 2) [1995] 2 IR 10, [1995] IESC 11 (17 November 1995). In particular, in the fourth, I considered the range of remedies which might be available for breach of that prohibition. I noted in that post that Part IV of the Referendum Act, 1994 (also here) provides for Referendum Petitions to challenge the conduct of a referendum. It comes as no surprise to learn that this procedure has now been invoked against the outcome of the referendum held on 10 November 2012 (Irish Examiner | Irish Independent | Irish Times | RTÉ | TheJournal.ie here and here | TV3). I expect the application to fail, but it has many interesting features which give it a fighting chance.

According to section 40 of the Act (also here), the referendum returning officer must aggregate the returns from all of the local returning officers, prepare and sign a provisional referendum certificate recording the votes and outcome in the referendum, and publish a copy of that provisional certificate in Iris Oifigiúil (the twice-weekly official Irish State gazette).…

Unconstitutional expenditures – IV – remedies for breach of the McKenna prohibition

13 November, 201223 April, 2016

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| Irish cases, Irish Law, Irish Supreme Court, Restitution

This is my fourth and final post on the per curiam in McCrystal v The Minister for Children and Youth Affairs [2012] IESC 53 (8 November 2012) (also here), which held that the defendants had acted wrongfully in expending public moneys on a website, booklet and advertisements in relation to the children’s referendum in breach of the prohibition in McKenna v An Taoiseach (No 2) [1995] 2 IR 10, [1995] IESC 11 (17 November 1995). In my first post, I looked at the background to the per curiam. In my second post, I explored exactly what was forbidden by McKenna, and concluded that it prohibits intentional partisan government expenditure. In my third post, I concluded that the precise constitutional basis for that prohibition is that such expenditure is undemocratic, unfair, unbalanced, unequal or partial, and that it may be restrained because it therefore violates the right to an equal franchise (see also the posts here by Paul McMahon and here by Laura Cahalane, and this assessment by Conor O’Mahony). In this post, I want to look at the remedies which might be available to a citizen for breach of that right.…

Unconstitutional expenditures – III – the basis of the McKenna prohibition

12 November, 20124 February, 2013

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| Irish cases, Irish Law, Irish Supreme Court

In previous posts, I noted that the Supreme Court in McCrystal v The Minister for Children and Youth Affairs [2012] IESC 53 (8 November 2012) (also here) held that the defendants had acted wrongfully in expending public moneys on a website, booklet and advertisements in relation to the children’s referendum in breach of the prohibition in McKenna v An Taoiseach (No 2) [1995] 2 IR 10, [1995] IESC 11 (17 November 1995), and I explored exactly what was forbidden by the McKenna prohibition on intentional partisan government expenditure (see also the posts here by Paul McMahon and here by Laura Cahalane). In this post, I want to consider the constitutional basis for the that prohibition.

There is a strong strain of democracy running through the majority judgments both in McKenna and in its companion case Hanafin v Minister for the Environment [1996] 2 IR 321, [1996] 2 ILRM 61 [1996] IESC 6 (12 June 1996). For example, in McKenna, Hamilton CJ held:

The role of the People in amending the Constitution cannot be over-emphasized. It is solely their prerogative to amend any provision thereof by way of variation, addition or repeal or to refuse to amend.

…