US Supreme Court – cearta.ie

Winter is coming: the future of First Amendment analysis, and the prospects for New York Times v Sullivan, after NYSR&PA v Bruen

25 October, 20227 May, 2023

| 1A, Defamation, Defamation, Freedom of Expression, Freedom of Expression, US Supreme Court

Cold winds now blow in the US Supreme Court around the stability of a century’s worth of First Amendment doctrine; even New York Times Co v Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964), the most stable of that Court’s speech precedents, now seems in danger of being blown away in the storm, thanks to the recent decision in New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v Bruen 597 US __ (2022) (Opinion pdf | Cornell | Justia | SCOTUSblog). In an earlier post on this blog, I considered the potential impact on the First Amendment of Thomas J’s originalist reasoning in the Second Amendment case of New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v Bruen, and found some distinctly chilly zephyrs. Thomas J for the majority (Roberts CJ, and Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett JJ concurring) held that a restriction on carrying arms in public for self-defense reasons was inconsistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation and was thus unconstitutional. Thomas J explicitly eschewed any standard of review such as strict or intermediate scrutiny, and it was with this that the minority (Breyer J; Sotomayor and Kagan JJ concurring) took most issue. This is nuts. Worse, in Bruen, Thomas J asserted some similarities in analysis between the Second Amendment and the First.…

The nutty wing of the Originalist camp is now in the SCOTUS ascendency – is it the death knell for tiers of scrutiny, especially in the First Amendment context?

26 June, 202225 October, 2022

| 3 Comments

| 1A, US Supreme Court

“I’m an originalist, but I’m not a nut”. This is how the Pontiff of Originalism, Justice Antonin Scalia (seated right), reportedly replied, when he was asked to compare his judicial philosophy to that of his US Supreme Court colleague, Justice Clarence Thomas (seated left). As of Thursday, Thomas J’s nutty originalism is in the ascendancy in the US Supreme Court. In New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v Bruen (23 June 2022; — US — (2022); Opinion pdf | Cornell html), the US Supreme Court held that a New York restriction on carrying firearms unconstitutionally prevented law abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms in public for self-defense. Referring to District of Columbia v Heller 554 US 570 (2008) (pdf) (which I critiqued here) and McDonald v Chicago 561 US 742 (2010) (pdf), the Court held that, to justify a firearms regulation, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation; as a consequence, the Court rejected any standard of review such as strict or intermediate scrutiny (which it described as “means-end” balancing tests). The Court identified firearms regulations that were consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and historical understanding, but held that none directly or analogically justified New York’s requirement that an applicant for a license to carry firearms outside the home had to demonstrate “a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general community”.…

Ar dheis Dé go raibh a h-anam dilís

19 September, 2020

| No Comments

| judges, US Supreme Court

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National Anthems and Political Dissent

28 September, 20169 October, 2017

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| Freedom of Expression, National Anthem, US Supreme Court

For various reasons (set out here, here, here, and here), I have been musing recently about what should and should not be in a National Anthem Bill. In the US, legislation provides that, when the national anthem (since 1931, “The Star-Spangled Banner“) is being played, “persons present should … stand at attention with their right hand over the heart” (emphasis added). Although the photograph left shows Barak Obama doing so as President in 2009, there was a minor controversy during the 2008 election when he neglected to do so at a campaign event. More recently, US gymnastics gold medalist Gabby Douglas apologized in the face of criticism when she neglected to do so during the playing of national anthem at an olympics medal ceremony. Neither Obama nor Douglas meant anything by it. Obama said his grandfather taught him to put his hand on his heart only during the pledge of allegiance, and only to sing during the national anthem. And Douglas was just overcome by the emotion of the moment.

But some people do take advantage of the anthem to make a political point. At the 1968 Olympics, US 200-metre medallists Tommie Smith (gold) and John Carlos (bronze) raised their own gloved hands during the national anthem while looking down as a way of opposing US state-sanctioned racism.…

The limits of judicial deference to academic judgment

28 June, 201617 September, 2020

| 1 Comment

| Academic judgment, Litigation, Universities, US Supreme Court

In my first post yesterday, I took certain comments of Kennedy J in the recent US Supreme Court decision in Fisher v University of Texas __ US __ (23 June 2016) as the context for an analysis of the nature of judicial deference to academic judgment. In this post, I want to look at the limits to such deference. Once those limits have been reached, substantive claims are entertained, even if they often fail (see M Davies “Challenges to ‘academic immunity’ – the beginning of a new era?” (2004) 16 Education & the Law 75).

This is true at both public and private law; and, whilst the public law analysis has dominated the cases (S Hedley “Students as Litigants: A Public Law or a Private Law Issue?” (2015) 14 Hibernian Law Journal 1 [hereafter: Hedley]), the line between these two procedures isn’t always clear. On the one hand, in Green v Master and Fellows of St Peter’s College Cambridge (The Times, 10 February 1896; cited in Hedley, 1; jpg) Wills J held that it was “obvious that the relation between an undergraduate and his college was not a contractual one”. Hence, in Jaffer v York University 2010 ONCA 654 (7 October 2010) [26], [28] (blogged here | here) Karakatsanis JA held that judicial review is the proper procedure when seeking to reverse an internal academic decision (approving Gauthier v Saint-Germain 2010 ONCA 309 (CanLII) (3 May 2010) [46] (Rouleau jca).…

The nature of judicial deference to academic judgment

27 June, 201617 September, 2020

| 2 Comments

| Academic judgment, Litigation, Universities, US Supreme Court

The US Supreme Court, though depleted at present to eight Justices after the death of Antonin Scalia, can still muster majorities in controversial cases.

One of the most controversial issues regularly before the Court (up there with abortion and guns) is affirmative action, especially in college admissions. At the end of last week, in Fisher v University of Texas __ US __ (23 June 2016) the Court held that a race-conscious admissions program in use at the time of petitioner’s application was lawful under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution. In the course of his judgment for the majority, Kennedy J stressed that, in the case of “an academic judgment … some, but not complete, judicial deference is proper”.

In this post and the next, I want to leave aside the (relatively narrow, but – in my view – sensible and precise) holding on the affirmative action issues, and focus instead on the issue judicial deference to academic judgment. In this post, I will consider the nature of such deference. In the next post, I will consider its limits.

In Fisher, Kennedy J held that, once “a university gives ‘a reasoned, principled explanation’ for its decision, deference must be given ‘to the University’s conclusion, based on its experience and expertise, that a diverse student body would serve its educational goals’,” (citing an earlier stage in the Fisher litigation: Fisher v University of Texas at Austin 570 US __ (24 June 2013); the earlier decision was referred to in the sequel as Fisher I, and the sequel under consideration here is being referred to as Fisher II).…

The fall of Saigon and Snepp v US

2 May, 20153 May, 2015

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| Freedom of Expression, Restitution, US Supreme Court

Saigon was the capital of South Vietnam, and its fall to the North Vietnamese 40 years ago this week, on 30 April 1975, effectively ended the Vietnam War. The image, left, is often taken as panic-stricken US citizens on the roof of the US Embassy trying to board the last helicopter out of Saigon. In fact, although there Many images images of the Embassy on that fateful day, the building in this famous photo is an apartment complex at 22 Gia Long Street; the people fleeing are Vietnamese; it was taken on 29 April; and the last helicopter took off at 07:53am the following day. Saigon is now Ho Chi Minh City, the largest city in the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, where the war now seems like a very distant memory, the US has been slower to learn the foreign policy lessons.

Reading about this anniversary this week brought to mind the case of Snepp v US 444 US 507 (1980). Frank Snepp was a member of the CIA in Saigon during the Vietnam War, and was one of the last Americans to leave the city as it fell to the North Vietnamese in 1975.…

Indentured servitude and a power akin to undue influence – contract reasoning in Pringle (ESM) and Sebelius (Obamacare)

15 November, 201228 November, 2012

| 1 Comment

| Contract, Irish Supreme Court, US Supreme Court

Occasionally, Contract Law principles infiltrate into constitutional discourse. Two recent Supreme Court decisions illustrate the point, one from Ireland, the other from the US. Each relates to an issue of major political controversy and constitutional contention; and, in each, contractual reasoning is at the heart of a significant aspect of the judgments.

In the Irish case of Pringle v Government of Ireland [2012] IESC 47 (19 October 2012) (noted here), the Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision to refer to the Court of Justice of the European Union various questions of EU law relating to the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (the ESM Treaty). In considering whether the ESM Treaty abrogated Irish sovereignty (in Articles 5, 6 and 28 of the Constitution) sufficiently to require an amendment to Article 29 of the Constitution to permit its ratification, Clarke J picked up on Hederman J’s dictum in Crotty v An Taoiseach [1987] IR 713, [1987] IESC 4 (9 April 1987):

The State’s organs cannot contract to exercise in a particular procedure their policy-making roles or in any way to fetter powers bestowed unfettered by the Constitution.

As a consequence, he analysed the sovereignty issue in contractual language:

8.3 … in international relations, as in very many other areas of public and private life, freedom to act will often, as a matter of practicality, involve freedom to make commitments which will, to a greater or lesser extent, limit ones freedom of action in the future.

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