During the course of the next month or so, we are going to hear a lot about the duty of broadcasters to be balanced, fair, objective, and impartial, in current affairs matters. In fact, TV3 have twice now sought to determine exactly what that duty means. First, earlier this month, TV3 queried whether this duty requires a moratorium on political coverage the day prior to polling and on election day. Then, last Thursday night, on Tonight with Vincent Browne, Browne suggested that if Fine Gael leader Enda Kenny did not accept TV3’s invitation to participate in an election debate with other party leaders, TV3 would go ahead with the debate with an empty chair where Kenny should have been; and Browne simply rebuffed Fine Gael’s Alan Shatter’s objection that the empty chair would breach TV3’s duty of impartiality. Given how supine Irish broadcasters have been in the past about the scope and limitations of this duty, I’m delighted to see TV3 take such a robust interpretation, and I look forward to further examples during the general election. In the meantime, in this post, I want to look at the fairness issues raised by the moratorium; in a future post I will look at those raised by the empty chair.

The duty of impartiality at issue in these cases flows from section 39(1) of the Broadcasting Act, 2009 (also here), which requires that broadcasters ensure that

(a) all news broadcast by the broadcaster is reported and presented in an objective and impartial manner and without any expression of the broadcaster’s own views,

(b) the broadcast treatment of current affairs, including matters which are either of public controversy or the subject of current public debate, is fair to all interests concerned and that the broadcast matter is presented in an objective and impartial manner and without any expression of his or her own views, except that should it prove impracticable in relation to a single broadcast to apply this paragraph, two or more related broadcasts may be considered as a whole, if the broadcasts are transmitted within a reasonable period of each other, …

Moreover, section 42(2) of the Act (also here) requires that the BAI prepare a broadcasting code providing

(a) that all news broadcast by a broadcaster is reported and presented in an objective and impartial manner and without any expression of the broadcaster’s own views,

(b) that the broadcast treatment of current affairs, including matters which are either of public controversy or the subject of current public debate, is fair to all interests concerned and that the broadcast matter is presented in an objective and impartial manner and without any expression of the broadcaster’s own views, …

The Broadcasting Authority of Ireland (BAI), reflecting the practice of its predecessor bodies, had taken the view that proper compliance with section 39 requires a moratorium on election coverage by the broadcast media during the final 24 hours before polling commences or while polling is underway, to allow voters a period for reflection in the final stages of an election campaign. Read the rest of this entry »

“Even the judges know who Naomi Campbell is”. At least Baroness Hale of Richmond does, since this is how she began her speech in Campbell v MGN [2004] AC 457, [2004] UKHL 22 (6 May 2004), in which she was a member of the majority which held that aspects of the Mirror’s coverage of Naomi Campbell’s fight against narcotics addiction – in particular, the publication of photographs which did not advance the public interest in the story – infringed her privacy. Today, in MGN v UK 39401/04 (18 January 2011) the Fourth Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) held that this holding did not infringe Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Campbell was awarded £3,500 for that invasion of privacy. For the appeal to the House of Lords, she had retained solicitors and counsel pursuant to a conditional fee agreement (”CFA”) which provided that if the appeal succeeded, solicitors and counsel should be entitled to success fees of 95% and 100% respectively. For the appeal to the House of Lords, legal fees were £288,468; and the success fees were £279,981.35; so the total fees were £594,470. Adding in the fees at first instance and before the Court of Appeal, Campbell’s costs amounted to a total of £1,086,295.47. In Campbell v MGN [2005] UKHL 61 (20 October 2005), the House of Lords approved an award of costs to her in this amount. In today’s judgment, (which I have noted here), the ECHR held that addition of the success fee infringed Article 10. As the Guardian’s headline put it: the European court deals [a] blow to no win, no fee deals in Naomi Campbell case.

This is a very signifcant decision for several reasons. Read the rest of this entry »

In the aftermath of the attempted assassination of Representative Gabrielle Giffords and the murder of six other people in Arizona last week, a fierce debate has broken out over the heated political rhetoric – often coarse, martial, and vitriolic – that is now distressingly commonplace in US political discourse. The specific background is a map which appeared on Sarah Palin’s website targeting the seats of political opponents – including Rep. Giffords – in rifle-sight cross-hairs, and which has therefore focussed signficant attention on Palin’s confused response to the tragedy. Of course, politicians and pundits across the political spectrum have used such language and imagery, and the issues of principle arise in the context of the general standard of debate rather than in the context of any particular politician, pundit or party. I want in this post to set out some of the general free speech arguments that I have come across since Saturday. Read the rest of this entry »

The 1960 movie Spartacus (imdb | wikipedia) (dir: Stanley Kubrick; screenplay: Dalton Trumbo) tells the story of a slave rebellion against ancient Rome led by the title character, a Thracian gladiator, played by Kirk Douglas. When the rebellion is eventually crushed by an army led by the Roman general and politician Marcus Licinius Crassus, played by Laurence Olivier, the recaptured slaves are told that they will be spared crucifixion if they identify Spartacus. Instead, one after another, they each proclaim “I am Spartacus“. It is a famous scene of solidarity – all the more so since screenwriter Dalton Trumbo was one of the blacklisted Hollywood 10, and he was the first blacklisted writer to write a screenplay his own name again when he wrote the screenplay for Spartacus, based on the novel by another blacklisted writer, Howard Fast. Wikipedia reports that the “documentary Trumbo suggests that this scene was meant to dramatize the solidarity of those accused of being Communist sympathizers during the McCarthy Era who refused to implicate others, and thus were blacklisted”.

The phrase has been in the news recently because it has been taken up on twitter #IamSpartacus in solidarity with Paul Chambers (Guardian | Telegraph). He was concerned that he would miss a flight last January from Robin Hood Airport in Nottingham to Belfast due to bad weather, and tweeted

Crap! Robin Hood airport is closed. You’ve got a week and a bit to get your shit together otherwise I’m blowing the airport sky high!!

He was fined £1,000 of sending a message of menacing character by means of a public electronic communications network contrary to section 127 of the Communications Act 2003; and his appeal was dismissed. The tweet was plainly a joke; the prosecution should never have been taken; it should have failed; and the appeal should have succeeded. It has become a cause célèbre on twitter #TwitterJokeTrial. And there is an excellent analysis of the legal issues by Matthew Flinn on the UK Human Rights Blog (reposted on Inforrm’s Blog):

Twitter joke trial: Do offensive tweeters have freedom of expression rights?

… Mr. Chambers is now taking his case on appeal to the High Court, and it will be interesting to see the extent of any discussion of his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and whether or not the application of section 127 to Mr. Chambers’ case is compatible with that right. Read the rest of this entry »

Picking up on last week’s post about Milton’s Areopagitica, in the classical liberal tradition, the fact that speech is offensive is not in itself a sufficient reason to censor it. As John Stuart Mill (pictured left) put it, “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others”. And he utterly rejected that offence could amount to such harm:

Before quitting the subject of freedom of opinion, it is fit to take notice of those who say, that the free expression of all opinions should be permitted, on condition that the manner be temperate, and do not pass the bounds of fair discussion. Much might be said on the impossibility of fixing where these supposed bounds are to be placed; for if the test be offence to those whose opinion is attacked, I think experience testifies that this offence is given whenever the attack is telling and powerful, and that every opponent who pushes them hard, and whom they find it difficult to answer, appears to them, if he shows any strong feeling on the subject, an intemperate opponent. But this, though an important consideration in a practical point of view, merges in a more fundamental objection. Read the rest of this entry »

Hart Publishing have just published Academic Freedom and the Law: A Comparative Study (cover left) by Eric Barendt:

Academic Freedom and the Law: A Comparative Study provides a critical analysis of the law relating to academic freedom in three major jurisdictions: the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States. The book outlines the various claims which may be made to academic freedom by individual university teachers and by universities and other higher education institutions, and it examines the justifications which have been put forward for these claims. Three separate chapters deal with the legal principles of academic freedom in the UK, Germany, and the USA. A further chapter is devoted to the restrictions on freedom of research which may be imposed by the regulation of clinical trials, by intellectual property laws, and by the terms of contracts made between researchers and the companies sponsoring medical and other research. The book also examines the impact of recent terrorism laws on the teaching and research freedom of academics, and it discusses their freedom to speak about general political and social topics unrelated to their work.

This is the first comparative study of a subject of fundamental importance to all academics and others working in universities. It emphasises the importance of academic freedom, while pointing out that, on occasion, exaggerated claims have been made to its exercise.

The title of this post is taken from the third paragraph of Milton’s Areopagitica. As I commented in an earlier post, one of the classic liberal justifications for freedom of expression was stated by John Milton (pitctured left) in his Areopagitica – A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicenc’d Printing, to the Parlament of England. According to The Writer’s Almanac with Garrison Keillor (with added links):

It was on this day in 1644 that John Milton published a pamphlet called Areopagitica, arguing for freedom from censorship. He said,

I wrote my Areopagitica in order to deliver the press from the restraints with which it was encumbered; that the power of determining what was true and what was false, what ought to be published and what to be suppressed, might no longer be entrusted to a few illiterate and illiberal individuals, who refused their sanction to any work which contained views or sentiments at all above the level of vulgar superstition.

He compared the censoring of books to the Spanish Inquisition and claimed that the government wanted “to bring a famine upon our minds again.” Read the rest of this entry »

Obscene. Once I had caught my breath, and collected my composure, this was my immediate reaction to learning that a high court jury had awarded 10 million euro in libel damages, made up of €9m in compensatory damages and €1m in aggravated damages. According to RTÉ:

A Co Louth businessman who took a libel action against his former employers after an incident in which he sleep walked naked has been awarded €10m in damages.

The jury agreed that a press release sent out by mining company Kenmare Resources in July 2007 insinuated that Donal Kinsella had made inappropriate sexual advances to company secretary Deirdre Corcoran on a business trip in Mozambique in May that year.

The award is the highest award of damages for defamation in the history of the State. … Lawyers for Kenmare Resources were granted a stay on the award pending an appeal to the Supreme Court. … Kenmare Resources issued a statement saying it was ’shocked’ at the verdict and it will ‘immediately and vigorously appeal the decision’.

The Irish Times added: “Outside court, Mr Kinsella (67) said he was ‘exhilarated and vindicated’ by the jury’s verdict”. I do not in any way begrudge him the vindication of his reputation, but does this really require 10 million euro? Indeed, the Journal.ie reported that the judge (Mr Justice Éamon de Valera) “appeared surprised at the scale of the damages being awarded”.

Appeals to the Supreme Court are pending in three other high profile cases of involving very high levels of damages. Read the rest of this entry »