In DW Griffith’s silent-era powerful – if flawed – classic movie, Intolerance (1916) (IMDB | wikipedia), the contemporary story of a poor young woman, separated by the intolerant prejudice of social reformers from her husband and baby, is interwoven with tales of intolerance from ancient Babylon, New Testament Judea, and Reformation France. These fables vividly warn of the dangers of intolerance. Two stories in today’s media demonstrate that intolerance of intolerance is simply intolerance, and is all the more dangerous for that.

UCC society withdraws Nick Griffin invite to ‘free speech’ debate

… In a statement this afternoon, the UCC Government and Politics Society said it had withdrawn the invitation as a result of submissions from University staff and Gardaí, who had outlined a “potential threat to the safety and welfare of our students and the general public”.

As with the earlier TCD debacle, this is as inevitable as it is dismaying.

French Senate passes bill outlawing genocide denial

… France’s upper house of parliament approved a bill on Monday that would make it a criminal offence to deny genocide, legislation that has caused tension between Paris and Ankara. The bill, which was approved by the lower house in December, has triggered outrage in Turkey as it would include the 1915 mass killing of Armenians in Ottoman Turkey.

As with earlier attempts to legislate truth, this is profoundly misguided.

We must not meet intolerance with intolerance. We must persuade others to avoid the intolerant; but we must not ban the intolerant; because, if we do, we become as bad as they are.

Bonus links, from the Irish Times (24 January 2012): UCC invitation to BNP leader pulled; Turkish fury likely over French bill on Armenian genocide; and Shatter opens Holocaust exhibition.

Last Tuesday, in the My Education Week column in the Irish Times, Paddy Prendergast, the Provost of Trinity College Dublin (and thus my boss) wrote a diary of his working week. This is how his entry for Wednesday, October 5th, began (with added links):

I meet with the Senior Dean and Dean of Students to discuss the student debating society, the Philosophical Society’s invitation to the BNP leader, Nick Griffin, to participate in a debate later this month. The issue has received considerable media coverage, but more importantly there are objections from our own college community. Freedom of speech is an important principle as is that of self-governance of student societies. We agree to meet with the Philosophical Society and consider this serious matter further. …

This seemed positive enough. Both freedom of speech and student society self-governance would pull in favour of allowing Nick Griffin to speak. Don’t get me wrong: Griffin’s views are loathsome, and the BNP is a hateful organisation, but I defend their right to spew their foul and horrid bile simply so that it can be exposed for the obnoxious and indefensible nonsense that it is. But this debate is not to be. According to a statement on the TCD website:

The University Philosophical Society and Trinity College Dublin have decided to withdraw the invitation to Mr Nick Griffin, leader of the British National Party. Mr Griffin was invited by the Philosophical Society to participate in a debate on October 20th next. After careful consideration of the matter, involving a series of discussions between the Philosophical Society’s officers and the College and taking all safety considerations into account, the decision was taken today (October 14th).

The College encourages balanced debate and freedom of speech at all times. It is a very important part of academic life, particularly among students and their societies. As part of the education of our students, the College also promotes the autonomy and self governance of student societies. These are important principles observed by the College.

Following careful review of operational and safety issues, the Philosophical Society and the College are now not satisfied that the general safety and well being of staff and students can be guaranteed. Access to the College will not be given to Mr Griffin or members of the BNP.

The University Philosophical Society feels it is unfortunate that circumstances have arisen under which the planned debate cannot go ahead without compromising safety.

The original invitation was predictably controversial. The decision to rescind it has garnered quite a bit of media coverage (BBC | DailyUpdate.ie | Irish Examiner | Irish Independent | Irish Times here and here | PA | RTÉ | StudentNews.ie | TheJournal.ie | University Times | UTV); and this has been welcomed by some of the visit’s critics (including the youth wing of the Irish Labour Party, and the Socialist Workers Party).

I am dismayed by this turn of events. Having several times wrapped themselves in the mantle of freedom of expression, TCD and the Phil have now let the mantle slip. Those who claim to respect freedom of speech must actively do so when it is difficult; else they do not really respect it at all. Freedom of speech is not always self-executing – when push comes to shove, it is necessary to be active in its defence and support. If a society such as the Phil invites controversial speakers, making a grab for the headlines, then that society must take all necessary steps to ensure that the controversial speakers actually have the opportunity to speak. Otherwise, the hecklers in a hostile audience will have a veto on the speakers. And the heckler’s veto is antithetical to freedom of speech. Hence, the US Supreme Court has rejected it as inconsistent with the freedom of expression guarantees in the First Amendment.

Read the rest of this entry »

According to the Adages of Erasmus, ‘vestes virum facit‘, which is often rendered in English as ‘clothes maketh the man’. Two different stories in today’s Irish Times brought this adage to mind. In the first, a picture tells a thousand words:

The photo is by Gonzalo Fuentes via Reuters and Yahoo. It shows French deputy Nicolas Dupont-Aignan covering his face with a scarf in the colours of the French flag to protest at the denial of speaking time to independent deputies during a debate about Libya at l’Assemblée Nationale in Paris yesterday. It demonstrates that what deputies wear in parliament can be as important as what they say. Sometimes, the sartorial expression is obvious, as where a slogan on a t-shirt makes the point. Sometimes, it’s a little more subtle, but all the more effective, as the photo above of Dupont-Aignan demonstrates. And sometimes, even a deputy’s normal everyday wear makes the point: in Ireland, Mick Wallace TD habitually wears a casual pink shirt. Like some other independent TDs, he dresses casually to make a point against unnecessary conformity and stuffiness; and he dresses in pink as “a challenge to the sad macho element in Irish society”. Read the rest of this entry »

Today is World Press Freedom Day (Unesco | IFEX | WPFD 2011 | WAN-IFRA), and there will be many events worldwide to celebrate, defend and promote press freedom. Free media are at the heart of freedom of expression, acting as watchdogs on governments, exposing corruption and rights abuses, and holding the powerful to account.

Piaras Kelly has news of an event today in Dublin marking World Press Freedom Day (with links by me):

Lal Wickrematunge’s brother, Lasantha, has been named as a “Hero of Press Freedom” by the International Press Institute following his murder by unknown assailants in 2009 when he was managing editor of The Sunday Leader, a Sri Lankan newspaper.

The Press Council of Ireland, in association with Ireland Aid, has arranged a free public lecture by Lal Wickrematunge to mark World Press Freedom Day on Tuesday 3 May 2011.

The lecture will take place between 2.30 pm – 4.00 pm in the Neil Hoey Lecture Theatre, Trinity Long Room Hub, Fellows Square, Trinity College Dublin. If you would like to attend please RSVP to info@presscouncil.ie or (01) 6489130.

In unfortunate timing, some of my students have an exam at exactly the same time, so I can’t attend. But I’d love to have been able to do so, and I hope that next year’s exam timetable doesn’t get in the way!

Last week, on 17 March, as the world celebrated Ireland’s national day in honour of St Patrick, the Taoiseach (the Irish Prime Minister) made the annual presentation of a bowl of shamrock to the President of the United States (pictured left). I seem to remember being taught in school that the reason the shamrock is one of Ireland’s unofficial national symbols is because St Patrick explained the Christian doctrine of the Holy Trinity by reference to the three leaves of the shamrock. I now work in a College named for the same Holy and Undivided Trinity. So, it might come as little surprise that I have recently been thinking about a trinity, though a rather more secular one. What I have in mind is the constitutional trinity on which many modern states are founded: liberal democracy and the rule of law.

All three elements of this trinity are multi-faceted, contestable, and elusive. Moreover, it is possible to conceive of a state which commits to one of the elements of this constitutional trinity, or even two, but – like a three-legged stool – they have become mutually reinforcing in many modern states, so much so that they often fade into one another both in popular conception and in more considered analysis. However, each element does contain some stability at its core. For the purposes of this post, I mean liberal in the sense that the state is committed to respect for and protection of individual rights; I mean democratic in the sense that citizens participate in government; and I mean the rule of law in the sense that, in a state founded upon a government of laws and not of men, the laws are equally applied in open court by an impartial judiciary.

Traditional free speech theory has tended to focus on only two elements of this trinity. There are many strong justifications for freedom of expression in both the liberal and democratic traditions. The question I want to ask in this post is whether there is a similar justification for freedom of expression in the rule of law, that is, in the third element of the constitutional trinity (or third leaf of the shamrock, or the third leg of the stool). To the extent that notions of liberty and democracy infuse our conception of the rule of law, then that conception will be bound up with liberal and democratic justifications for free speech. However, to the extent that our conception of the rule of law is distinct from notions of liberty and democracy, then the question that arises is whether there is a justification for free speech in this separate conception of the rule of law. This requires two things: first, an assessment of the elements of the rule of law; and, second, an assessment of the extent to which these elements of the rule of law reinforce and are reinforced by robust protection of freedom of expression.

First, I will take the elements of the rule of law as sketched by the late Law Lord, Tom Bingham, in his final book The Rule of Law (Allen Lane, 2010):

1. The law must be accessible, and so far as possible intelligible, clear and predictable (p37)
2. Questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved by application of the law and not by the exercise of discretion (p48)
3. The laws of the land should apply equally to all, save to the extent that objective differences justify differentiation (p55)
4. Ministers and public officers at all levels must exercise the powers conferred on them in good faith, fairly, for the purpose for which the powers were conferred, without exceeding the limits of such powers[,] and not unreasonably (p60)
5. The law must afford adequate protection of fundamental rights (p66)
6. Means must be provided for resolving, without prohibitive cost or inordinate delay, bona fide civil disputes which the parties themselves are unable to resolve (p85)
7. Adjudicative procedures provided by the state should be fair (p90)
8. The rule of law requires compliance by the state with its obligations in international law as in national law (p110).

It is immediately clear that many of these elements of the rule of law both reinforce and are reinforced by robust protection of freedom of expression. On the one hand, Bingham’s fifth point – that the law must afford adequate protection of fundamental rights – reinforces the necessity for the protection of free speech as one of those fundamental rights. On the other hand, his second, sixth and seventh points – which relate to the proper functioning of impartial judicial tribunals – are reinforced by the protection of free speech, which ensures monitoring of and comment upon the operation of such tribunals. Indeed, the ancient principle of open justice is one of the foundations of modern media speech rights. Likewise, Bingham’s fourth and eighth points – which relate to the proper role of government – are similarly reinforced by the protection of free speech, which ensures monitoring of and comment upon the operation of government. Indeed, this is the central justification for the watchdog role of the media. Even more fundamentally, his first and third points – which relate to the irreducible minima of good laws – are reinforced by the protection of free speech, which ensures the discussion of laws to ensure that they meet these basic requirements. If this analysis is right, then many of the elements of freedom of expression which we take for granted seem to flow at least as much from the rule of law as they do from liberal and/or democratic free speech justifications.

Finally, to be parochial for a moment, Barrington J in Irish Times v Ireland [1998] 1 IR 359, [1998] 2 ILRM 161 and Murphy v Independent Radio and Television Commission [1999] 1 IR 26, [1998] 2 ILRM 360 tied liberal conceptions of free speech to the Article 40.3.1 right to communicate, and democratic conceptions to the Article 40.6.1 right to freedom of expression. A free speech justification founded in the rule of law might find its home in the Article 34.1 commitment to open justice and the Article 40.6.1 reference to the rightful liberty of expression of the organs of public opinion.

If liberal democracy and the rule of law together constitute the constitutional trinity on which many modern states are founded, and if there are strong liberal and democratic justifications for freedom of expression, then, in essence, my question is this: are there similarly strong free speech justifications founded in the rule of law? The answer I have floated in this post is that there are. Do you agree? Please exercise your free speech in the comments below.

In Watters v Independent Star [2010] IECC 1 (03 November 2010), the first reported judgment on the Defamation Act, 2009 (also here), Matthews J granted the plaintiff a declaratory order pursuant to section 28 of the Act (also here) that an article published by the defendant was defamatory, and he made a further order pursuant to section 33 of the Act (also here) prohibiting the newspaper from re-publishing the defamation.

In an earlier post (also here), I have already looked at some issues arising from this decision. Another critical aspect of Matthew J’s judgment was that, although the plaintiff was a convicted criminal, he nevertheless possessed a residual reputation which was damaged by the newspaper’s allegations. Of course, evidence of a plaintiff’s general bad reputation is admissible in evidence in mitigation of damages (see section 31(4)(g) and section 31(6)(a) of the Act (also here); see also Hill v Cork Examiner Publications [2001] 4 IR 219, [2001] IESC 95 (14 November 2001) and the recent decision of Tugendhat J in Hunt v Evening Standard [2011] EWHC 272 (QB) (18 February 2011)). However, this is a long way from saying that such a general bad reputation renders a plaintiff libel-proof. Moreover, the plaintiff in Watters did not seek damages, but rather sought and obtained a declaratory order and an injunction.

Section 33 of the 2009 Act allows the court to make interim, interlocutory or permanent orders prohibiting the publication or further publication of the defamatory statement in respect of which the application was made, and it was on foot of that section that Matthews J granted a permanent injunction restraining re-publication of the defamation. In my earlier post, I considered its applicability in the context of interim and interlocutory applications; and I argued that, in much the same way as the previous common law had been, section 33 had to be interpreted in the light of the protections of freedom of expression by the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights. In particular, since such a temporary injunction constitutes a prior restraint upon speech, applications for interim or interlocutory injunctions in defamation cases must be scrutinised with particular care.

In principle, such considerations derived from the Constitution and the Convention should also be in play when – as in Watters – an application is made under section 33 for a permanent injunction as a remedy for defamation. In the US, it has been argued that a permanent injunction imposed after trial nevertheless amounts to a prior restraint upon any subsequent speech. However, the courts have held that injunctions against certain statements based on a finding on the merits that those particular statements are defamatory effectively do not amount to prior restraints and are therefore not presumptively unconstitutional (see Balboa Island Village Inn v Lemen 156 P 3d 339 (Supreme Court of California, 2007); St James Healthcare v Cole 2008 MT 453 (Supreme Court of Montana, 2008); Hill v Petrotech Resources Corp (Supreme Court of Kentucky, 21 October 2010) (blogged here on the Volokh Conspiracy)). These cases demonstrate the confusing doctrinal consequences of the US rule against prior restraints. A final order prohibiting future publication is indeed a prior restraint upon that future speech; it would be better if the US cases accepted that rather than denying it; but they would then have to go on and hold that the full trial establishing the defamatory nature of the publication overcomes the presumption against prior restraint.

By contrast, the approach to prior restraints in Ireland, influenced by the Convention, is much more nuanced, and it does not run into the same doctrinal problems justifying a section 33 permanent injunction as a remedy after trial in defamation cases. Even if a permanent injunction does indeed constitute a prior restraint upon future speech, and thus a restriction upon the right to freedom of expression protected by the Constitution and the Convention, the question would not be whether the constitutional presumption against prior restraint has been overcome, but whether, after a close and penetrating examination of the facts, the permanent injunction is a necessary and proportionate restriction upon that right. In the circumstances of Watters v Independent Star, this test would almost certainly have been satisfied, but it may nevertheless be worth a future defendant’s while taking the point. However, given the recent demise of the Star on Sunday, it won’t be that defendant.

Some orders have been made on foot of the Defamation Act, 2009 (also here) – see, for example, Lowry v Smyth (background here and here; coverage of the order here), Mellon v Associated Newspapers (coverage here), and Meegan v Associated Newspapers (coverage here) – but Watters v Independent Star [2010] IECC 1 (03 November 2010) remains the only reported judgment on provisions of the Act. In that case, the newspaper had published an article headlined Larry’s Secret Shower Buddy, purporting to expose a a “seedy”, “weird”, “bizarre” and “secretive” homosexual relationship in prison between the plaintiff Barry Watters and Larry Murphy, a notorious criminal who had been convicted of rape and attempted murder. Matthews J held that the plaintiff had a residual reputation which was damaged by the newspaper’s allegations. He therefore granted the plaintiff a declaratory order pursuant to section 28 of the 2009 Act (also here) that the article was defamatory, and he made a further order pursuant to section 33 of the 2009 Act (also here) prohibiting the newspaper from re-publishing the defamation. Nevertheless, the newspaper repeated the defamation: in an article alongside a photograph of Watters the newspaper had stated:

We may have to apologise to this revolting pervert but will we mean it? Hell no.

As a consquence, the newspaper was fined 40,000 euros for contempt of court (can anyone tell me whether this fine was paid before the Irish Daily Star on Sunday is to ceased publication?). Moreover, the judge ordered that a fair summary of the earlier judgment in which he found that the applicant had been defamed be published by the newspaper with equal prominence to the layout of the original defamatory article. The facts are sensationalist, but they raise an important issue of legal principle relating to section 33 of the 2009 Act, which allows the court to make interim, interlocutory or permanent orders prohibiting the publication or further publication of the defamatory statement in respect of which the application was made.

The issue of injunctions in defamation cases is a fraught and controversial one. This is particularly so in the context of interim and interlocutory injunctions. However, as recent US cases have demonstrated, difficult issues can also arise in the context of permanent injunctions to restrain the republication of defamatory comments of the kind sought, awarded and breached in Watters. In this post, I want to look at interim and interlocutory injunctions; and I will return to the question of permanent injunctions in a future post. Read the rest of this entry »

I enjoy political debate; and I particularly enjoy political debates on television between political party leaders. I will therefore be a happy spectator tomorrow night when TV3 host the first such leaders’ debate of the current election campaign. But, as things now stand, Enda Kenny, the leader of Fine Gael, the party which is leading in all of the polls, will not participate. One of the consequences of his refusal to do is that he has made the broadcaster part of the story, and not simply the means by which the political story reaches us, the viewing public. (It’s not the only example of the broadcaster being the story this week: there was a spat between Newstalk and RTÉ; and there were calls for a deputy leaders’ debate and a women’s debate). As a general rule, it’s not a good thing when the broadcaster becomes part of the story; it means something has gone awry with the normal functioning of the political process. When that happens, people often reach for their lawyers. Last week, a leading member of Kenny’s party suggested that having the debate without Kenny (perhaps with an empty chair to symbolize his absence) would breach TV3’s statutory duty of impartiality. I’m surprised I haven’t heard more of this since, but it would not amaze me at all if someone attempts to make this canard fly again over the next few days.

Section 39(1)(b) of the Broadcasting Act, 2009 (also here), requires that broadcasters ensure that their treatment of current affairs “is fair to all interests concerned and that the broadcast matter is presented in an objective and impartial manner and without any expression of … [their] own views”. Clearly, if TV3 had excluded Kenny from a debate featuring other leaders, they would be in breach of this duty (Wilson v IBA 1979 SLT 279; R v BCC, ex parte Owen [1985] QB 1153; Lynch v BBC [1983] 6 NILB 1; Wilson v IBA (No 2) 1988 SLT 276; R v BBC, ex parte Referendum Party [1997] EMLR 605; SNP v Scottish TV (Court of Session, Outer House; 15 April 1997); Boyle [1986] Public Law 562; Munro (1995) 145 NLJ 518). Indeed, in such hypothetical circumstances, they may well be in breach of constitution (Coughlan v Broadcasting Complaints Commission [1998] IEHC 62 (24 April 1998); aff’d [2000] IESC 44 (26 January 2000); [2000] 3 IR 1 (HC, Carney J; SC); Kelly v Minister for the Environment [2002] IEHC 38 (16 May 2002)). But TV3 have not excluded Kenny; instead, they have invited him to participate, and he has chosen not to. This is simply the latest in a long and ignominious tradition of politicians declining to face (running away from?) uncomfortable questions on inhospitable programmes from disagreeable interrogators. It is plain common sense that a decision of a broadcaster to go ahead with a programme after a politican or representative of a political viewpoint has declined the opportunity to participate should not, for that reason, infringe the duty of fairness and impartiality. Otherwise, that refusal would give the refusenik a veto to stymie the broadcast.

Moreover, those cases demonstrate that compliance with s39 is not a formal or mechanical matter; instead, the broadcaster must take a realistic approach to their attempts to achieve balance. Indeed, even section 39 recognises that formal or mechanical compliance with its terms is often difficult, since it goes on to stipulate that if it is impracticable to comply with the duty of fairness and impartiality in relation to a single broadcast, then “two or more related broadcasts may be considered as a whole”, provided that the broadcasts “are transmitted within a reasonable period of each other”. For example, a series of one-on-one interviews with leading politicians would plainly satisfy these conditions. So, even if there are concerns about Kenny’s absence from the debate on Tuesday night, TV3 could counter that their overall election coverage more than makes up for them.

In short, even if Enda Kenny declines an invitation to participate in a leaders’ debate on TV3, and TV3 nevertheless go ahead with the debate without him (perhaps with an empty chair, or worse), there would be no substance to any objection from Fine Gael that this is in breach of their statutory duties of fairness and impartiality.