Finally, and a little more seriously, the print edition – but not, so far as I can see, the online edition (though it may in time be published in the archives of the Education section or, perhaps, of the Technology sections) – has a really interesting piece on distance learning at third level, discussing the Open University and Hibernia College. Online education poses both challenges and opportunities for bricks and mortar universities, and they will have to be faced and embraced if universities are to survive and thrive.
The moral of the stories is, of course, that if the undergraduates who now outnumber farmers can’t tear themselves away from their email and social networking sites, they might decide to eschew traditional universities and study online instead!
I suppose if I spent ages thinking about it, I could find a spurious thread linking three stories that caught my eye over the last few days, but in truth there is none, except that they update matters which I have already discussed on this blog. (Oh, all right then, they’re all about different aspects of freedom of expression: the first shows that copyright should not prevent academic discussion; the second shows that hecklers should not have a veto; and the third is about broadcasting regulation).
First, I had noted the proclivity of the estate of James Joyce to be vigorous in defence of its copyrights; but it lost a recent case and now has agreed to pay quite substantial costs as a consequence:
The James Joyce Estate has agreed to pay $240,000 (€164,000) in legal costs incurred by an American academic following a long-running copyright dispute between the two sides. The settlement brings to an end a legal saga that pre-dates the publication in 2003 of a controversial biography of Joyce’s daughter, Lucia, written by Stanford University academic Carol Shloss. …
The proposed visit of the controversial historian David Irving to the NUI, Galway Literary & Debating Society has been cancelled. In a statement the Lit & Deb said the cancellation was “due to security concerns and restrictions imposed by the university authorities”. …
In essence, the Bill requires telecommunications companies, internet service providers, and the like, to retain data about communications (though not the content of the communications); phone and mobile traffic data have to be retained for 2 years; internet communications have to be retained for one year. This is better than it could have been, in that the Directive would have allowed 2 years for all traffic data; but it is a lot worse than the minimum of 6 months allowed by the Directive. This will impose significant costs on those obliged to retain and secure the data, and those costs will be passed on to their already hard-pressed customers. And it is likely to drive international telecommunications and internet companies to European states which have introduced far less demanding regimes.
Traffic data retention (like any example of pre-emptive and widespread surveillance) is simply a bad idea; it is a massive invasion of privacy; it is founded on the illiberal and anti-democratic suspicion that someone somewhere might be doing something; and it is not good enough to reply that if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear from surveillance. As the prolific and challenging AC Grayling argues in his new book Liberty in the Age of Terror: A Defence of Civil Society and Enlightenment Values (Bloomsbury, 2009; reviewed by The Economisthere), this perniciousassertion is “one of the most seductive betrayals of liberty” imaginable; it assumes that
the authorities will always be benign; will always reliably identify and interfere with genuinely bad people only; will never find themselves engaging in ‘mission creep’, with more and more uses to put their new powers and capabilities to; will not redefine crimes, nor redefine various behaviours or views now regarded as acceptable, to extend the range of things for which people can be placed under suspicion—and so considerably on.
The concerns might be met by strong protections coupled with meaningful oversight, but the Bill is worryingly bereft on this score. Although it imposes obligations to retain data, and to maintain it secure, and to prevent unauthorised access to data, it does not provide any redress to someone whose data is retained insecurely or accessed without authorisation; and the Data Protection Acts, 1988 (also here) and 2003 (also here) are inadequate to cope (for example, they would provide no criminal sanction for the News of the World’s recently-disclosed shenanigans). Worse than that, large-scale databases are peculiarly vulnerable to attack – an investigation by More4 News for Channel 4 reported last week (in a story that should give some pause to those planning a system to trace patients for Ireland) that more than 8,000 dangerous viruses have infected NHS computers in the last year, overloading networks, and massively compromising large amounts of personal data.
It is appropriate to restrict individual privacy provided that there is a good reason to do so, and the restrictions do not good too far. In the context of this Bill, the prevention of crime is a good reason, but the restrictions seem to go very far indeed, especially in the absence of proper protections and oversight. In S and Marper v UK 30562/04 [2008] ECHR 1581 (4 December 2008) one of the reasons given by the European Court of Human Rights for holding that the UK’s retention of innocent people’s DNA records on a criminal register infringed their right to privacy was the lack of sufficiently strong safeguards. I am a Director of Digital Rights Ireland; this is one aspect of our ongoing challenge to Ireland’s data retention regime; and this flawed Bill does nothing to alleviate these concerns.
Jörges hands over the Charter to Reding (Photo: EUobserver)
On 25 May 25 2009, 48 editors-in-chief and leading journalists from 19 countries adopted and signed the European Charter on Freedom of the Press in Hamburg. In ten articles, the Charter formulates principles for the freedom of the press from government interference. Yesterday, the Charter was presented to the EU Commissioner for the Information Society and Media (hat tip: European Media Blog; see EU press relase).
In an effort to counter increasing worries about infringement of press freedom by governments in Europe, both within the EU and beyond, the editor-in-chief of Germany’s weekly Stern magazine [Hans-Ulrich Jörges], together with EU media commissioner Viviane Reding on Tuesday (9 June) celebrated the launch of the European Charter on Freedom of the Press … In March, the Open Society Institute’s media programme – a pressure group focussing on media freedom in emerging democracies – criticised the European Commission in a report that argued that broadcasting across Europe, particularly in the east but also in Italy, is undergoing a “counter-reformation” – a backsliding towards overt political control after the post-Cold War period, when leaders relaxed their grip on TV and radio. … The European Commission came in for criticism for not holding new EU member states to account after promises concerning media freedom were made ahead of accession. …
There is a tension at the heart of creativity. On the one hand, I might be moved by the muse to write/paint/create something interesting (I know, if you’ve read anything on this blog, you might wonder if that muse has ever struck, but bear with me). If I am, the law is likely to reward me for doing so by giving me a copyright (or similar intellectual property right) in what I have written/painted/created. On the other hand, the muse might strike you in such a way as to develop what I have done (entirely plausible, if you ask me), but my copyright protection can make this hard for you. You could email me and ask me if I’d let you do it, and I’d probably say yes. But now, multiply this a million million fold, to take into account everyone who has copyright and everyone who wants to develop a copyrighted work. Asking for individual permission every time becomes a logistical nightmare. So, Creative Commons has filled the gap, by drafting licences which any copyright holder may use to determine how others may exercise their copyright rights. If you look below the last post at the bottom of this page, you will see that I use just such a licence to allow you to use and share the contents of this blog, provided that you do so for non-commercial reasons and give me an attribution.
The terms of this licence are drafted having regard to US copyright law, which is similar to Irish copyright law in the same way as close cousins are similar: there is a strong family resemblance, but thereareveryimportantdifferences. The similarities are enough that I can reasonably use the US text, and I do; but it would be better to have a version drafted specifically to take Irish law into account. As I have mentioned previously on this blog, for some time now, Dr Darius Whelan and Louise Crowley of the Law Faculty, UCC have been working on just such a draft of an Irish Creative Commons Licence.
We are now fortunate to have the next fruits of that labour, as theyhavejustannouncedthat an Irish draft of the Creative Commons license version 3.0 is now available for public discussion, on either their mailing list or their blog. They have taken the existing US Creative Commons v3.0 licence and localised it to Irish conditions in the light of the Copyright and Related Rights Act, 2000 (also here) as amended in 2004 (also here) and 2007 (also here).
They have produced a good summary (pdf) of their reasoning for the various changes they recommend. It seems to me thorough, comprehensive, and persuasive – all in all, an excellent piece of work which will benefit the entire Irish online community. I eagerly look forward to the day when I make this blog subject to the Irish version of the licence. In the meantime, click on the widget below:
It never rains but it pours. Having recently blogged about about Emily Laidlaw’s article on search engine accountability, I’ve just come across the similarly important article by Oren Bracha and Frank Pasquale on Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search93Cornell Law Review 1149 (2008) (pdf). They robustly argue that general-purpose search engines are better characterized not as media outlets (contrast Finklestein) but as common carriers (quite a common argument in the online context), that they should therefore come under common law duties that govern public utilities (appropriately adapted), and that – by analogy with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) – a new regulatory framework (the Federal Search Commission (FSC) of the title) should be established. They conclude:
Search engines, in whatever form they might assume, will continue to be a major part of our informational environment in the foreseeable future. The normative concerns associated with their unique position of power are here to stay. A properly designed regulatory approach may do much to ameliorate these concerns. Courts should not end the debate over the contours of such an approach before it begins.
Hear, hear! However, if online search requires an FSC in the US, then it will require equivalents in other jurisdictions as well. Moreover, given the global reach of the internet, there may be need for some kind of international congruence of such regulation to make it workable. In this respect, the better analogy may not be with the FCC, but – as Daithí is always eager to point out – with two earlier international organisations, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) established in 1865 and the Universal Postal Union (UPU) established in 1874, both of which are now specialised agencies of the United Nations (UN). Read the rest of this entry »
I have had occasion to comment on this blog that the Roman poet Juvenal asked Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (who will watch the watchers?). Emily B Laidlaw, in her fascinating article, Private Power, Public Interest: An Examination of Search Engine Accountability, raises the parallel question of who will keep the keepers? In the vast new information age bequeathed to us by the internet and the world wide web, gatekeepers are those who enable – and control – our access to that information. At present, they are all private entities, and even if they wish to do no evil, there is no reason why they should actually do some good, let alone act in the public interest. Laidlaw’s analysis therefore focuses on the important issue, who will keep the (gate)keepers; here’s the abstract:
As information becomes a critical commodity in modern society, the issue is raised whether the entities that manage access to information, that are tools for public discourse and democracy, should be accountable to the public. The Internet has transformed how we communicate, and search engines have emerged as managers of information, organizing and categorizing content in a coherent, accessible manner thereby shaping the Internet user’s experience. This article examines whether search engines should have public interest obligations. In order to answer this question, this article first examines comparative public interest regulatory structures, and the growing importance of the Internet to public discourse. Then examined is how the algorithmic designs and manual manipulation of rankings by search engines affects the public interest without a sufficient accountability structure. Finally, the values necessary to a public interest framework are suggested.
The European Court of Justice has given its decision today in the Irish Government challenge to the Data Retention Directive – [Case C-301/06] Ireland v. Parliament and Council (Press Release | Judgment). Unsurprisingly (in light of the Advocate General’s Opinion) it has held that the directive was properly adopted as an internal market measure (by qualified majority voting) rather than as a criminal matter (requiring unanimity). Where does this leave us and our case?
While it’s a pity to see the Directive upheld, the Government’s challenge was a very narrow one, dealing only with the essentially technical matter of the legal basis for the Directive. The Government didn’t raise and the ECJ wasn’t asked to decide on the fundamental rights issues. Indeed it expressly stated:
The Court notes at the outset that the action brought by Ireland relates solely to the choice of legal basis and not to any possible infringement by the directive of fundamental rights resulting from interference with the exercise of the right to privacy.
Consequently, the decision doesn’t affect the core of our challenge to the Directive, which will still go ahead on the basis that it infringes the rights to privacy and freedom of expression. At the moment we’re waiting on a decision from the High Court on our application to refer these issues to the ECJ – we’re confident that when these issues reach the ECJ that they will decide in our favour.
There are some – related – articles in today’s Irish Independent on themes which have featured on this blog. A report published yesterday by the Higher Education Authority (HEA) shows that the number of students going to college has hit a record high (the Irish Times ran the same story under the headline that there are more students than farmers in Ireland) and that courses in science and computing are now back in favour. 
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